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College tuition has increased dramatically over the last three decades.  
From 1982 to 2006, the average total of tuition and fees jumped 439%, 
greatly outpacing the average increase in family income of 147% over the 
same period.1  The high cost of a college education forces many students to 
take out loans, resulting in an average debt burden of $24,000 for the Class 
of 2009.2  Many debtors, especially those who borrow to attend both 
undergraduate and graduate schools, face debt burdens that are several 
times higher.  Furthermore, an increase in reliance on private loans, as 
opposed to comparatively cheaper government-backed loans, results in 
repayment difficulties for the many borrowers who will be saddled with 
high interest rates for decades to come.  The volume of private loans 
issuance doubled from $7.2 billion in the 2003–2004 academic year to $15 
billion in the 2007–2008 academic year.3  Perhaps even more perplexing, 
however, is the fact that a majority of students who relied on private loans 
did not even take out the maximum amount of federal Stafford loans, which 
charge a lower interest rate than private loans.4  Over a quarter of students 
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 1.  THE NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY & HIGHER EDUC., Measuring Up 2008: The 
National Report Card on Higher Education 8 (2008), http://measuringup2008. 
highereducation.org/print/NCPPHEMUNationalRpt.pdf.  
 2.  Tamar Lewin, Average College Debt Rose to $24,000 in 2009, Report Finds, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2010, at A15. 
 3.  THE PROJECT ON STUDENT DEBT, PRIVATE LOANS: FACTS AND TRENDS 1 (2009), 
available at http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/private_loan_facts_trends_09.pdf. 
 4.  Id.  
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taking out private loans took out no Stafford loans whatsoever.5 
Unlike other private debts such as credit card balances, car loans, and 
mortgages, student loans are virtually impossible to discharge in 
bankruptcy.6  The United States Bankruptcy Code (“the Bankruptcy Code”) 
makes educational loans nondischargeable only if the continued obligation 
to repay will not impose an “undue hardship” on the debtor.7  But in 2008, 
only 29 of 72,000 student loan borrowers in bankruptcy managed to have 
their loans discharged—less than one twentieth of one percent of all 
borrowers.8  Recent research indicates that the extent of relief obtained by 
those few debtors is heavily contingent on extralegal factors:  a debtor’s 
inability to repay her loans was less of a factor affecting whether she 
obtained relief than her attorney’s level of experience or the past tendencies 
of the bankruptcy judge presiding over her case.9  Most student loan 
borrowers have little chance to discharge their debt in bankruptcy, and 
what chance they do have remains largely out of their control. 
This was not always the case.  Prior to 1976, educational loans were 
treated the same as all other loans, so educational loans were dischargeable 
in bankruptcy.10  Congress gradually increased the bankruptcy protection 
for lenders of educational loans over time, and amended the Bankruptcy 
 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Tanya Roth, Will Change in Bankruptcy Law Affect Student Loans?, LAW & DAILY 
LIFE BLOG (May 7, 2010, 10:45 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/law_and_life/2010/05/ 
change-in-bankruptcy-law-could-effect-student-loans.html. 
 7.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006). 
 8.  Mark Kantrowitz, Congress Proposes Allowing Private Student Loans to be 
Discharged in Bankruptcy, FASTWEB (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.fastweb.com/financial-
aid/articles/2259-congress-proposes-allowing-private-student-loans-to-be-discharged-in-
bankruptcy. 
 9.  Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue 
Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 232–34 (2009).  The authors note 
that the absence of a statutory definition of undue hardship leads to inconsistent applications 
of the law:   
As one bankruptcy judge has observed, because of the lack of a statutory 
definition for undue hardship, ‘so much is therefore left to the individual view 
of each judge who, after all, brings the sum of who and what he was, what he 
has become, and what he sees through his own eyes.’  When disparate treatment 
results from the judge to whom a case has been assigned, rather than from 
differences in the factual characteristics underlying a debtor’s claim of undue 
hardship, we have a uniform law only in form and not in substance.  In the 
context of undue hardship discharge litigation, this has the consequence of 
denying access to justice and thus undermining the fresh start principle 
enshrined in the Bankruptcy Code.  
Id. at 234.  
 10.  Id. at 180. 
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Code in 2005 to extend this protection even to private, for-profit lenders.11  
Proponents of these laws argue that they increase the availability of student 
loans and decrease the rates of interest that lenders will charge; if 
borrowers cannot get out from their responsibilities, banks will be more 
willing to extend them credit in the first place.  Critics hotly dispute these 
contentions, pointing to evidence suggesting that allowing modification of 
student loans in bankruptcy would have little to no effect on the price or 
availability of those loans, and would allow overburdened debtors to pay as 
much of their loans as feasible while obtaining a fresh start and 
contributing to economic growth. 
Some signs indicate a return to an era of more lenient treatment of 
student loans in bankruptcy.  In a recent case, United Student Aid Funds v. 
Espinosa, the Supreme Court allowed a debtor to discharge some student 
loan debt without a finding of undue hardship.12  The case was decided on 
narrow grounds, and standing alone is not likely to change the way in 
which student loan bankruptcies are handled; however, taken with other 
recent developments, it may indicate changes in the industry.  For example, 
H.R. 5043, also known as the Private Student Loan Bankruptcy Fairness 
Act, which was proposed in April of 2010, would have made private 
student loans easier to discharge.13  Though it stalled in the House Judiciary 
Committee and never made it to a vote, it may be a harbinger of future 
legislation. 
In this Comment, I argue for a relaxation of the bankruptcy 
restrictions on student loan debt.  After charting the statutory changes in 
bankruptcy law, I shall show how the more recent developments in 
Espinosa and H.R. 5043 indicate a shift in the momentum of bankruptcy 
policy in the United States.  Then, I examine the justifications for making 
student loans nondischargeable, and explain why a return to the pre-2005, 
or even pre-1978, laws would create a more equitable system without 
unfairly impacting creditors or significantly restricting borrowers’ access to 
new credit.  Finally, I draw on studies concerning the modification of home 
mortgages as a point of comparison.  Recent analyses of the economic 
assumptions underlying the bankruptcy modification of home-mortgage 
debt that arose out of the recent mortgage foreclosure crisis indicate that a 
liberalization of modification laws would have little effect on the price and 
availability of loans.14  I use these same economic analyses to evaluate the 
 
 11.  Id. at 181. 
 12.  130 S.Ct. 1367 (2010). 
 13.  Private Student Loan Bankruptcy Fairness Act of 2010, H.R. 5043, 111th Cong. 
(2d Sess. 2010). 
 14.  See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of 
Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 648 (2009) (arguing instead for increased 
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dischargeability of student loans, arguing that the proposed changes in the 
student loans industry would have a similarly small effect on the price and 
availability of student loans. 
I. BACKGROUND:  THE INCREASING PROTECTION FOR STUDENT LOAN 
LENDERS SINCE 1976 
Federal bankruptcy law is designed to afford debtors a fresh start—an 
opportunity to clear all or much of their debt so that they can begin anew 
with a clean slate.15  A Chapter 7 discharge involves the liquidation of 
much of the debtor’s assets and a discharge of nearly all her debts.16  
Before obtaining a Chapter 7 discharge, however, a debtor must pass a 
means test.17  This ensures that individuals with incomes above the mean 
level in their states and with adequate disposable income do not abuse the 
bankruptcy system.  If the debtor does not qualify for Chapter 7, she can 
still file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, which allows the debtor to keep more of 
her property, but requires a repayment plan over the course of three to five 
years.18  A Chapter 13 repayment plan must return to creditors at least as 
much money as they would have received under a Chapter 7 liquidation.19  
Though bankruptcy is no financial panacea, it improves the situation of the 
majority of the debtors who file.  A recent study found that one year after 
filing for Chapter 7, seventy-five percent of filers were no longer having 
trouble paying their debts.20  For the twenty-five percent who were still 
having difficulties, researchers found that most were not abusing credit, but 
rather struggling with “keeping a roof over their family’s heads.”21  The 
majority of those who file for bankruptcy “are acknowledging the realities 
of their debts” and treat “the decision to file in bankruptcy as a responsible 
financial step.”22  Bankruptcy serves as an important legal protection so that 
debtors can emerge from financial distress. 
Before 1976, educational loans could be discharged in bankruptcy, 
 
modification of home mortgages in bankruptcy as a solution to the foreclosure crisis). 
 15.  See Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1047, 1047, 1059 (1987) (recognizing statutory steps of counseling, exercising 
intelligent choices in bankruptcy, and avoiding future financial difficulties). 
 16.  11 U.S.C. § 727 (2006). 
 17.  See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006) (determining, via means test, which consumer 
debtors have the ability to repay their debts).  
 18.  11 U.S.C. § 1322 (2006). 
 19.  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2006). 
 20.  Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 84 (2006). 
 21.  Id. at 86. 
 22.  Id. at 124. 
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like other types of debt.23  Whether through a Chapter 7 liquidation or a 
Chapter 13 reorganization and repayment plan, individuals who had 
overwhelming educational debt retained a safety valve.  Those debtors for 
whom there was no prospect of earning an adequate income to repay their 
loans could have some or all of those loans discharged.  But the 
Bankruptcy Act Commission, which Congress established in 1970 to help 
reform the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, recommended a new direction.24  
When the Commission issued its recommendations in 1973, it was 
generally full of pro-debtor policies; however, members ceded ground on 
the issue of student loan debts in an effort to gain public confidence.25  The 
provisions were perceived as necessary to prevent public outrage at 
allowing students to shirk responsibility, despite evidence that less than one 
percent of government-backed loans were discharged in bankruptcy.26 
As congressmen debated whether to protect government-backed 
student loans from discharge in bankruptcy, two competing viewpoints 
became clear.  Representative James O’Hara fought against the adoption of 
the bill, arguing that the bill “visits a special discrimination upon 
[students] . . . it treats educational loans precisely as the law now treats 
loans incurred by fraud, felony, and alimony-dodging. No other 
legitimately contracted consumer loan . . . is subjected to the assumption of 
criminality which this provision applies to every educational loan.”27  This 
view looked at the proposed protections as an unwarranted exception, 
singling out students as one of the only groups for whom bankruptcy 
protections are not available.  On the other hand, Representative Allen E. 
Ertel compared the options of a recent college graduate with high debt, and 
concluded that a student who declared bankruptcy would be “rewarded for 
refusing to honor a legal obligation.”28  By declaring bankruptcy and 
discharging all debt, the student would receive a free education and learn 
that “it ‘does not pay’ to honor one’s debts or other legal obligations.”29  
Representative Ertel saw the amendment not as singling out students, but as 
closing a loophole.30 
Ertel’s viewpoint carried the day, and the Bankruptcy Code was 
 
 23.  Pardo & Lacey, supra note 9, at 180. 
 24.  Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: 
An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 420 
(2005). 
 25.  Id. at 420–21. 
 26.  H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 178 n.5 (1973).   
 27.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1232, at 75 (1976), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 149 
(1977), and 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6110. 
 28.  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 536-37, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6424. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 538, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6425. 
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amended to make the discharge of student loans more difficult.  It was only 
a first step, however, towards the current state of near-impossibility of 
student loan discharge.  First, the 1976 Amendments applied only to 
federally insured and guaranteed loans.  Students were still eligible to 
discharge loans from any non-governmental lenders.31  Furthermore, the 
amendments put in place the “time-lapse rule,” which specified that loans 
would not be dischargeable only if they had come due within five years of 
the bankruptcy filing.32  Therefore, loans that had been due for more than 
five years could be discharged; if a debtor’s financial distress was 
prolonged, he could simply wait out the time-lapse rule and discharge his 
loans after five years.  Finally, the amendments allowed for a discharge, 
even for federally backed loans, even within five years of when they came 
due, if repayment of those loans would impose an “undue hardship” on the 
debtor.33  This language has remained in the Bankruptcy Code to this date, 
though courts’ interpretation of its meaning has become ever stricter. 
Congress revised the bankruptcy provisions relating to the 
dischargeability of student loans five times since 1976, making it 
progressively harder for student debtors to obtain a discharge.34  Legislators 
have employed two methods to accomplish this end:  (1) protecting an 
increasingly broad class of creditors, and (2) narrowing the set of situations 
in which a student debtor may seek a discharge.35  In 1979, legislators 
expanded the protection for creditors to include “educational loans made, 
insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or a nonprofit institution of 
higher education.”36  This amendment meant that loans needed only to be 
guaranteed or insured, and not necessarily issued, by the federal 
government for creditors to receive protection in bankruptcy.  By 1984, the 
language was amended again to protect private student loans that were 
funded or guaranteed in any part by a governmental or nonprofit entity.37  
In 1990, the five-year waiting period during which a debtor could not 
discharge his loans was increased to seven years; in 1998 it was eliminated 
altogether, and affected loans could not be discharged after any time 
period.38  By 2005, the requirement for loans was broadened to include 
 
 31.  Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, 90 Stat. 2081 (codified at 20 
U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976)), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, ch. 90, § 316, 92 
Stat. 2549. 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Pardo & Lacey, supra note 24, at 427. 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Act of Aug. 14, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-56, 93 Stat. 387. 
 37.  Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 
98 Stat. 333. 
 38.  Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789; Higher Education 
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“any qualified educational loan,” so that, not just governmentally funded, 
but all student loans were exempt from discharge, regardless of the 
lender.39 
The history of student bankruptcy legislation, then, shows a clear 
progression towards complete nondischargeability of all forms of student 
loans in bankruptcy.  Many critics argue that an unsubstantiated myth of 
abusive student debtors has fueled this progression; for example, rhetoric 
about future high-earning doctors and lawyers strategically eliminating the 
entirety of their debt through bankruptcy.  These myths, however, are not 
substantiated by data of actual bankruptcy filings.40  In fact, the General 
Accounting Office report that Congress considered when first tightening 
regulation for student loan bankruptcies in the 1970s revealed that less than 
1.8% and 1.3% of those filing were lawyers and doctors, respectively.41  
This myth of abusive student debtors, however unfounded, only fueled the 
progression towards stricter laws.  The progression of increasing strictness 
has also “emboldened [some courts] to apply the undue hardship standard 
from a less forgiving stance.”42  Though the record of the debate in 
Congress shows sharply divided views, like those of Representatives 
O’Hara and Ertel examined above, courts increasingly looked to the 
recommendations of the Bankruptcy Committee’s 1973 report to find 
support for tightening the requirements for a finding of undue hardship.43  
Even though the Committee’s views do not necessarily reflect Congress’ 
intent at the time, they have been used to justify the current law allowing 
virtually no discharges for student debtors, irrespective of their 
circumstances. 
 
Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581. 
 39.  Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-8, 119 Stat. 23. 
 40.  Pardo & Lacey, supra note 24, at 427. 
 41.  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 143 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6104. 
 42.  Pardo & Lacey, supra note 24, at 428. 
 43.  See, e.g., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1306 (10th Cir. 
2004) (observing that statutory provisions designed by the Committee were “designed to 
remove the temptation of recent graduates to use the bankruptcy system as a low-cost 
method of unencumbering future earnings”); Cazenovia College v. Renshaw (In re 
Renshaw), 222 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that the Committee’s heightened undue 
hardship recommendations were supported by “increasing abuse of the bankruptcy process 
that threatened the viability of educational loan programs”); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. 
(In re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting congressional intent that ordinary 
hardship, as opposed to undue hardship, should not facilitate a discharge of student loans). 
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II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:  A REVERSAL OF COURSE? 
Despite the trend toward increasing protection for creditors over the 
last thirty-five years, a recent case, United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 
allowed a debtor to discharge some student loan debt without a finding of 
undue hardship.44  Though the case was decided on narrow grounds, and 
will not directly impact the way in which student loans are treated, it 
signals at the very least a change in momentum.  H.R. 5043, which would 
have made private student loans easier to discharge, also stands as a sign of 
a new direction in bankruptcy policy.45 
In Espinosa, a student-loan debtor obtained a Chapter 13 discharge of 
some of his student loan debt without a finding of undue hardship when his 
creditors failed to object to his proposed plan.46  Espinosa’s only source of 
indebtedness was $17,832 in student loans, of which $13,250 was principal 
and $4,582 was accrued interest.47  He proposed a Chapter 13 plan to repay 
the principal and discharge the interest.  Espinosa’s creditor did not object, 
the bankruptcy court did not make a finding of undue hardship, and the 
interest was discharged.48  Seven years later, the creditor began efforts to 
collect the discharged interest, arguing that the bankruptcy court did not 
have the power to discharge any of Espinosa’s educational loans without a 
finding of undue hardship.49 
The Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code’s undue hardship 
requirement in section 523(a)(8), though described as “self-executing” in 
previous cases,50 meant only that the bankruptcy court must make an undue 
hardship finding even if the creditor does not request one, not that its 
failure to make such a finding renders a subsequent confirmation order 
void.51  Despite the bankruptcy court’s error—it should have made a 
finding of undue hardship—that error did not rise to a level of severity 
sufficient to reopen the case.  Perhaps more significantly, the Supreme 
Court distinguished student loans from other types of nondischargeable 
 
 44.  United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S.Ct. 1367 (2010). 
 45.  H.R. 5043 . 
 46.  Espinosa 130 S.Ct. at 1373. 
 47.  Id. at 1373–74. 
 48.  Id. at 1374. 
 49.  Id. at 1375. 
 50.  See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 450 (2004) (noting that 
“[u]nless the debtor affirmatively secures a hardship determination, the discharge order will 
not include a student loan debt. . . . Thus, the major difference between the discharge of a 
student loan debt and the discharge of most other debts is that governmental creditors, 
including States, that choose not to submit themselves to the court’s jurisdiction might still 
receive some benefit: The debtor’s personal liability on the loan may survive the 
discharge.”). 
 51.  Espinosa, 130 S.Ct. at 1379. 
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debt, like specified tax debts, domestic support obligations, and debts 
arising from unlawful operation of a vehicle while intoxicated.52  By 
drawing a distinction between student debt and these other forms of debt, 
the court affirmed that the former might be dischargeable with a finding of 
undue hardship, while the latter is never dischargeable, no matter the 
circumstances. 
Media and commentators predicted that the decision would portend a 
series of changes in the bankruptcy industry.53  Some suggested that the 
ruling would open a loophole for the discharge of student loans.  Given the 
short timeline in which lenders can object to Chapter 13 reorganization 
plans, discharges not technically allowed by the Bankruptcy Code, like the 
one in Espinosa, would be bound to slip through the cracks.54  However, it 
is important to bear in mind that Espinosa does not increase the availability 
of a discharge for educational loans under Chapter 13.  The debtor was 
successful only because of the lender’s failure to object and the bankruptcy 
court’s erroneous approval of the plan.55  Many bankruptcy judges have 
stated that they would not approve plans that discharge student loans, 
whether or not the lender objected, because they are clearly contrary to the 
Bankruptcy Code.56  The Supreme Court itself addressed the issue in 
Espinosa as more an issue of striking a “balance between the need for 
finality of judgments and the importance of ensuring that litigants have a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate a dispute.”57  Nevertheless, Espinosa 
represents, at the very least, recognition that student loans are 
dischargeable in some circumstances, and it may also signal a change in the 
direction of student loan reform. 
H.R. 5043, the Private Student Loan Bankruptcy Fairness Act of 2010, 
also signaled a potential reversal of direction in bankruptcy policy.  The bill 
would have reversed the amendments of 2005, removing bankruptcy 
protection from private student lenders.58  Congressman Steve Cohen 
introduced the bill, stating that, “[t]he bankruptcy system should work as a 
 
 52.  Id. at 1379 n.10. 
 53.  Adam Liptak, Bankruptcy Ruling in Student Loan Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 
2010, at A17; Nina Totenberg, High Court Hears Student Loan Bankruptcy Case, NPR 
(Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120846940&ft=1&f= 
1001; Maryam K. Ansari, Supreme Court Rules for Debtor in Student Loan Discharge Case, 
FINDLAW (Mar. 24, 2010, 10:54 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/decided/2010/03/sup-ct-
rules-for-debtor-in-student-loan-discharge.html.  
 54.  Asher Hawkins, Bankruptcy: New Haven For Student Borrowers?, FORBES (Oct. 
20, 2009, 2:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/20/student-loan-discharge-supreme-
court-personal-finance-espinosa.html. 
 55.  Espinosa, 130 S.Ct. at 1378. 
 56.  Id.  
 57.  Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1380.   
 58.  H.R. 5043 . 
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safety net that allows people to get the education they want with the 
assurance that, should their finances come under strain by layoffs, 
accidents, or other unforeseen life events, they will be protected.  My bill 
takes a modest but important step toward achieving this goal.”59  He 
pointed out that private loans only concern private profit, with no 
governmental cap on interest rate or amount borrowed.60  Another sponsor 
of the bill, Representative Daniel K. Davis, noted that the “2005 change 
gave special federal protections to for-profit lenders, penalized borrowers 
for pursuing higher education, and provided no incentive to private lenders 
to lend responsibly.  Private education debt is no different than other 
consumer debt; it involves private profit and deserves no privileged 
treatment.”61  A similar companion bill was introduced in the Senate.62  
Though H.R. 5043 was voted out of subcommittees in September 2010 by 
a vote of six yeas to three nays, it never made it out of committee for a vote 
on the floor.63  The Senate version of the bill also stalled, and never came to 
a vote.64 
As one would expect, the student loan industry opposed the legislation 
to repeal protection for private student lenders.  Sallie Mae, the largest 
private student loan company in the country, said that it supported the spirit 
of the legislation, but objected to the “singling out” of private loans.65  
Sallie Mae spokesman Conway Casillas advocated for Congress to “extend 
the same consumer protections to all education loans, regardless of the 
source or tax status of the entity or governmental institution providing the 
funds.”66  Interestingly, Casillas also noted that the company would support 
 
 59.  Congressman Steve Cohen’s Private Student Loan Bankruptcy Fairness Act of 
2010 Passes Subcommittee, COHEN FOR CONGRESS (Sept. 15, 2010), 
http://www.cohenforcongress.com/category/h-r-5043/. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Davis Applauds Advancement of Legislation to Protect Students with Private 
Education Loans, THE ONLINE OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN DANNY K. DAVIS, 
http://davis.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=217&Itemid=1 (last 
visited May 8, 2012). 
 62.  Fairness for Struggling Students Act of 2010, S. 3219, 111th Cong. (2010), 
available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-s3219/show. 
 63.  Private Student Loan Bankruptcy Fairness Act of 2010, H.R. 5043, 111th Cong. 
(2d Sess. 2010), available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h5043/show; 
Congressman Steve Cohen’s Private Student Loan Bankruptcy Fairness Act of 2010 Passes 
Subcommittee, supra note 59. 
 64.  Fairness for Struggling Students Act of 2010, S. 3219, 111th Cong. (2010), 
available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-s3219/show. 
 65.  Proposed Legislation Allows Discharge of Private Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 
STUDENT LOAN BLOG (MAY 4, 2010), http://web.archive.org/web/20100508203138/ 
http://www.nextstudent.com/student-loan-blog/blogs/sample_weblog/archive/2010/05/04/ 
Proposed-Legislation-Allows-Discharge-of-Private-Student-Loans-in-Bankruptcy.aspx. 
 66.  Id. 
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“reform that would allow federal and private student loans to be 
dischargeable in bankruptcy for those who have made a good-faith effort to 
repay their student loans over a five-to-seven-year period and still 
experience financial difficulty.”67  This sort of reform, while leaving in 
place the 2005 amendments protecting private student loans, would 
essentially undo the 1998 amendments that eliminated the “time lapse 
rule,” so that any educational debt would be potentially dischargeable after 
a period of good-faith effort to repay.  Perhaps the lenders realized that if 
debtors struggling after five to seven years of repayment efforts were 
unlikely to ever get out from under the loan, and the lender would be able 
to extract little additional money by refusing a discharge. 
Student loan advocacy groups, on the other hand, supported the bills, 
and argued that Sallie Mae’s proposals would not go far enough to protect 
student debtors.  Alan Collinge of StudentLoanJustice.org, an on-line group 
advocating for borrowers who have defaulted on their student loans, 
objected to any sort of time lapse rule that would require that borrowers 
make payments on their student loans for five to seven years before the 
loans become dischargeable.  Collinge insisted that student loan borrowers 
should be afforded “the same fundamental consumer protections that all 
other borrowers enjoy.”68 
Ultimately, neither the Espinosa decision nor the failed reforms of 
H.R. 5043 and S. 3219 did much to ease the burden of student loan debt.  
However, they did incite interest in student loan reform, and they signal 
that perhaps the march towards non-dischargeability of student loan debt 
has reached its nadir and will soon reverse course.  The proposed 
legislation has provoked sharp critiques of the current policy in mass 
media, raising the profile of the cause.69  A single Facebook group has 
amassed nearly 300,000 supporters for student loan forgiveness.70  The time 
is ripe for reform. 
 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Jane Bryant Quinn, Student Loans: Time to Reform the Law That Treats Debtors 
Like Crooks, CBSNEWS (Sept. 24, 2010, 9:34 AM), http://moneywatch.bnet.com/investing/ 
blog/make-money/student-loans-time-to-reform-the-law-that-treats-debtors-like-
crooks/492/. 
 70.  See ForgiveStudentLoanDebt.com, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/groups/ 
forgivestudentloandebt/ (last visited June 2, 2012) (advocating unconditional loan discharge, 
without bankruptcy, for student loan debtors).   
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III. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DISCHARGEABILITY:  WOULD 
MAKING STUDENT LOANS DISCHARGEABLE HELP OR HURT 
STUDENTS? 
The policy arguments behind student bankruptcy discharge policy are 
couched in terms of either student welfare or simple morality.  No large 
bank will argue that student loans should remain nondischargeable in 
bankruptcy in order to help their own bottom line, though that 
consideration must certainly enter into their calculus.  Instead, lenders 
argue that dischargeability of student loans would be bad for students in the 
aggregate.  They posit that if student loans could be discharged, lenders 
would experience greater exposure to the risk of bankruptcy write-offs, and 
so would necessarily tighten the requirements for obtaining a loan, thereby 
making private student loans unobtainable for many borrowers, especially 
those with lower credit scores.71  This would result in a net decrease in 
welfare to students as a group.  There is no benefit to having the ability to 
discharge a loan in bankruptcy if you cannot get a loan in the first place.  
Alternately, lenders often advance simple moral arguments, saying that 
allowing discharge will encourage unscrupulous students to abuse the 
system, take banks’ money, and escape with a free education. 
John Pottow has developed several more specific explanations that 
could justify special protections for student loans in bankruptcy, including:  
fraud, soft fraud, internalization, preservation of the public fisc, and the 
cost of private capital.72  Noting that other nondischargeable debts are all 
extraordinary, like those of an intentional tortfeasor, drunk driver, or a 
parent owing child support,73 Pottow concludes that it must take one or 
more of these compelling reasons to justify the policy of non-
dischargeability of student loans.74  The first four are essentially moral 
arguments, while only the cost of private capital addresses concern with the 
borrower himself.  In this section, I address these five arguments for 
maintaining the current anti-discharge system and examine the responses 
and empirical studies that contradict each position. 
The fraud theory assumes that students deliberately borrow money 
with no intention of paying it back.75  Though this may seem to be an 
 
 71.  Proposed Legislation Allows Discharge of Private Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 
STUDENT LOAN BLOG (MAY 4, 2010), http://web.archive.org/web/20100508203138/ 
http://www.nextstudent.com/student-loan-blog/blogs/sample_weblog/archive/2010/05/04 
/Proposed-Legislation-Allows-Discharge-of-Private-Student-Loans-in-Bankruptcy.aspx. 
 72.  John A.E. Pottow, The Nondischargeability of Student Loans in Personal 
Bankruptcy Proceedings: The Search for a Theory, 44 CAN. BUS. L.J. 245 (2007). 
 73.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2006). 
 74.  Pottow, supra note 72, at 250. 
 75.  Id. at 251.   
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extreme allegation, it would certainly justify the current policy if students 
were in fact deliberately scamming the bankruptcy system en masse.  As 
discussed above, there is a pervasive, yet unsubstantiated, myth of student 
abuse in the bankruptcy system:  the archetypal greedy lawyer who 
discharges his student loans on the eve of beginning his lucrative career.76  
Despite the absence of any data to confirm these myths, courts still view 
students in a negative light.  The Third Circuit bemoaned that it must 
“account for the fact that one of the most common reasons student loan 
debtors find themselves in bankruptcy court is that their ‘subjective value 
judgments’ are often (but not always) indicative of a spendthrift 
philosophy.”77 
Even if students were abusing the bankruptcy system by borrowing 
money with the intent to discharge rather than repay the debt, that alone 
could not justify a separate provision making student loans non-
dischargeable.  There are already other fraud provisions in the Bankruptcy 
Code to protect against this abuse, and the same potential for abuse exists 
in all bankruptcy cases.  The Bankruptcy Code clearly exempts any debt 
incurred fraudulently from discharge, whether or not it relates to 
educational debt.78  A justification for nondischargeability of student loans 
based on a theory of fraud, then, would have to presuppose that the fraud 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code were ineffective, or that students as a 
class were disproportionately acting fraudulently.  Even if this were the 
case, a better solution would be to modify the fraud provisions themselves, 
making them stricter and more specific to address any problems in the 
student context, rather than implementing the overbroad measure of 
rendering all student debt nondischargeable. 
Next, and more plausible, is a theory of soft fraud.  This theory posits 
that a student did not take on educational loans with the intent to never 
repay them, but rather chose bankruptcy after completing his education, 
when he realizes it would be advantageous.79  This theory is more akin to 
opportunism, and, as already discussed, Representative Ertel voiced this 
concern in the drafting of the initial modifications of the Bankruptcy Act in 
the 1970s.80  If a student, saddled with tens, or even hundreds, of thousands 
of dollars of educational debt realizes that he can discharge that debt 
immediately after graduation, when he likely has little personal property 
but high earning potential, it would be advantageous for him to do so.  
 
 76.  See supra text accompanying notes 40–41. 
 77.  Penn. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 304 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
 78.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2006). 
 79.  Pottow, supra note 72, at 253. 
 80.  See supra note 28. 
BAKER_FINAL_3866380.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/7/2012  3:33 PM 
1226 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:4 
 
Educational debts are different than other debts under this theory because 
they tend to be incurred at a younger age, when there are more years of 
earnings ahead of the debtor, and because the educational degree for which 
the debt was incurred cannot be taken away from the debtor as a result of 
the bankruptcy.81  If a consumer debtor took on credit card debt to amass 
luxury goods, many of those goods would be liquidated during a 
bankruptcy, and the possession of those goods would not have increased 
the debtor’s expected future income in any way.  For a student, however, a 
J.D. or M.D. cannot be stripped away in bankruptcy, and the degree will 
have greatly increased the debtor’s future earnings. 
However, there is a dearth of empirical evidence showing that any 
such abuse existed before the nondischargeability provisions were 
introduced into the Bankruptcy Code in the 1970s.82  Furthermore, the 
outright ban on the discharge of student loans is an overbroad solution to 
this problem.  The Bankruptcy Code could simply make the discharge of 
educational debts contingent on future earnings, so any debtor declaring 
bankruptcy would be forced to repay a percentage of future earnings if they 
rose above a set level.83 
Similar to soft fraud is the theory of internalization, which argues that 
education is primarily a private rather than a public good, in that it confers 
on the student the subjective enjoyment of study for several years, as well 
as an increased expectation of future income.84  Of course, an income-
contingent repayment scheme could curtail this abuse just as easily as it 
could curtail soft fraud.  However, where internalization differs from soft 
fraud is in the case of the low-income debtor.  For example, a cellist who 
incurs a high debt burden to be trained, and then embarks on a low-income 
career, would be eligible for discharge under an income contingent 
repayment model.  One judge mused that “it is difficult to imagine a 
professional orchestra musician who would not qualify for an undue 
hardship discharge.”85  Such a musician, then, would internalize the benefit 
of his education in personal enjoyment, but never be able to pay back its 
cost.  This seems feasible, though it is surely not widespread.  The majority 
of debtors will take loans to pursue a higher-earning career, not a lower-
earning one.  Furthermore, a cellist-debtor who took out loans without the 
 
 81.  Pottow, supra note 72, at 254–55. 
 82.  See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 24, at 420 (explaining that “[d]espite evidence 
presented to the [1973] Commission that less than one percent of federally insured student 
loans were discharged in bankruptcy, its recommendation essentially sought to preempt 
‘potential abuses,’ defaults that industry representatives of the student loan system 
anticipated would occur”). 
 83.  Pottow, supra note 72, at 267.   
 84.  Id. at 256. 
 85.  In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d 89, 93 (5th Cir. 2003).   
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intent to repay them would still be subject to the Bankruptcy Code’s fraud 
provisions. 
A public fisc theory argues that nondischargeability of student loans is 
necessary to preserve the solvency of the government’s student loan 
program.  If loans are easy to discharge, the theory goes, it will be more 
attractive for students to declare bankruptcy.86  More discharges will lead to 
more losses for the government, and less money available to lend to new 
borrowers.  This is straightforward, and convincing at first glance. 
However, this theory rests upon the assumption that the decision to 
file bankruptcy is endogenous:  that debtors are making a strategic choice 
to file bankruptcy rather than filing out of necessity.87  Empirical research 
contradicts this assumption, suggesting that debtors are not strategically 
considering bankruptcy ex ante, but rather choosing it as the only way out 
of dire circumstances.88  Of course, the public fisc theory completely falls 
apart when considering protection for private lenders.  The bankruptcy 
protections extended to private educational lenders in 2005 cannot be 
justified in terms of conserving governmental resources, but rather look 
like a bare preference for one segment of private loans over another. 
Finally, an argument based on the cost of private capital supposes that 
treating student loans more harshly in bankruptcy will decrease the number 
of filings, increase profits for lenders, and, ergo, make the loans more 
available in the first place.89  With higher returns on educational loans, 
lenders would be more willing to lend to higher-risk borrowers, essentially 
lowering the minimum credit score required for loan approval.  This can be 
justified if, from a public policy perspective, the government wants to make 
student loans cheaper than other loans, say, credit cards for example.90 
Recent research does not support this argument.  Analysis of the FICO 
credit score of borrowers before and after the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (which introduced 
protection for private lenders) revealed little change in the availability of 
loans.91  If the private capital argument were correct, one would expect to 
see a decrease in the average credit score of private loan borrowers, as 
lenders became more willing to take on high-risk borrowers because of the 
increased bankruptcy protection of BAPCPA.  Borrowers from Sallie Mae 
had an average credit score of 718 both before and after the legislation, 
 
 86.  Pottow, supra note 72, at 261.   
 87.  Id. at 270. 
 88.  Id. at 270 n.105. 
 89.  Id. at 262. 
 90.  Id. at 263. 
 91.  Mark Kantrowitz, Impact of the Bankruptcy Exception for Private Student Loans 
on Private Student Loan Availability, FINAID.ORG (2007), http://www.finaid.org/educators/ 
20070814pslFICOdistribution.pdf. 
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while borrowers from First Marblehead had FICO scores of 719 before the 
legislation and 715 afterwards.92  The latter number represents a change in 
availability of loans, but a very small one.  Furthermore, the low end of the 
FICO spectrum (i.e., the minimum credit score a borrower must have in 
order to be approved for a loan) remained virtually unchanged for both 
Sallie Mae and First Marblehead.93  The research, then, indicates that “[i]f 
Congress were to roll back the BAPCPA exception to discharge for private 
student loans . . . it [would be] unlikely to result in a significant decrease in 
private student loan availability to prospective borrowers with low credit 
scores.”94  This conclusion, that there would be little if any effect on the 
availability of loans based on changes in dischargeability, undermines one 
of the most persuasive arguments for limiting student loan discharge in 
bankruptcy. 
The arguments for the removal of bankruptcy protection for student 
loans are far more convincing, especially in the absence of a compelling 
reason for the continued existence of the exceptions.  The protection of 
student loan debt, and not any other variety of private debt, represents an 
unjustified windfall for lenders.  Debtors in unstable financial situations 
may never be able to get out from under the burden of their loans.95  Means 
testing that is already a part of the Bankruptcy Code prevents debtors with 
high incomes from discharging their loans.96  Furthermore, an income-
contingent repayment system could easily demand higher payments from 
any debtor who experiences an increase in earnings after filing for 
bankruptcy.  And there is always the stigma and negative impact on credit 
scores that accompany bankruptcy; no evidence exists to suggest that 
debtors take filing for bankruptcy lightly.97  Removing the unwarranted 
protection for student loan lenders in bankruptcy would not open the 
floodgates to opportunistic filers, but rather open an escape hatch for those 
who legitimately need the protection afforded by the bankruptcy system.  
Leaving the current system in place benefits only private lenders, not 
student borrowers. 
 
 92.  Id. at 5. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See Justin R. La Mort, Generation Debt and the American Dream: The Need for 
Student Loan Reform, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (MAY 21, 2010), http://hlpronline.com 
/2010/05/lamort_deb/ (discussing the deleterious effects of student debt and examining the 
removal of unwarranted bankruptcy protection of student loans and institution of loan 
forgiveness programs as potential solutions). 
 96.  See id. (noting that in 2005, Congress amended the bankruptcy code to add a means 
test and counseling requirements). 
 97.  See id. (observing the “serious consequences” of bankruptcy on the bankrupt’s 
credit score and employment prospects). 
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IV. A POINT OF COMPARISON – EFFECT OF MORTGAGE MODIFICATION IN 
BANKRUPTCY ON THE COST AND AVAILABILITY OF LOANS 
Similar to the debate over the dischargeability of student loans, an 
intense debate over the modification of mortgages during bankruptcy has 
emerged.  Over 10% of American households with mortgages were past 
due or already in foreclosure in 2008–the highest level ever.98  And, just as 
it affords special protection for student loan lenders, the Bankruptcy Code 
contains strong protections for mortgage lenders; any mortgage loan that is 
secured primarily by a debtor’s principal residence cannot be modified in 
bankruptcy.99  Unless a debtor can repay a mortgage on its original terms, 
including all fees she may have incurred for falling behind on payments, 
the lender will need to foreclose on the house to recoup at least some of the 
loan.  The justification for this policy mirrors that of student-loan 
nondischargeability:  allowing modification of loans would increase 
interest rates and decrease the availability of mortgages.100  Of course, 
mortgages are different from student loans in that the property serves as 
collateral, whereas a lender cannot foreclose on a student’s diploma.  But 
the question of whether allowing bankruptcy modification will affect 
interest rates and availability so closely corresponds to the student context 
that an examination of the mortgage modification question can illuminate 
some new aspects of the student loan debate. 
Adam Levitin argues that allowing modification of all mortgages 
would not affect their price or availability, and furthermore would “help 
foster voluntary, private solutions to the mortgage crisis.”101  To test this 
hypothesis, Levitin looked for any variation in mortgage interest rates 
between owner-occupied single-family homes and other property types.102  
Because only mortgages secured by a debtor’s principal residence are 
immune from bankruptcy modification, one would expect to see a 
difference in interest rates between property types if the laws protecting 
against mortgage modification were indeed lowering interest rates by 
protecting lenders.  Comparing rates from four major mortgage lenders, 
across three states, and a wide range of credit scores, Levitin found no such 
 
 98.  See Delinquencies Continue to Climb in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey, 
MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter 
/68008.htm (reporting record jumps in delinquency rates for mortgage loans on one-to-four-
unit residential properties). 
 99.  11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006). 
 100.  See Levitin, supra note 14, at 572 (2009) (noting that “preventing modification of 
home-mortgage loans in bankruptcy limits lenders’ losses and thereby encourages greater 
mortgage credit availability and lower mortgage credit costs”). 
 101.  Id. at 576.  
 102.  See id. at 586–87 (discussing the author’s experiment design).  
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difference in interest rates, leading him to conclude that, “[t]he expected 
rate-premium differential among property types does not exist.”103  Levitin 
explained this failure to price in response to bankruptcy law on the cost of 
foreclosure.  Due to fees, transactional costs, and the low value obtained at 
foreclosure sales, lenders could actually recover somewhat more money 
through bankruptcy than foreclosure.104 
The modification of mortgages, like the modification of student loans, 
should seek to increase the amount that the lender can recover while 
decreasing the debt burden of the borrower to a level that she can feasibly 
repay.  If both bankruptcy and foreclosure impose high fees and transaction 
costs on both parties, then one must wonder why both parties cannot work 
out a mutual modification outside of bankruptcy.  Levitin explains that 
market frictions, including disincentives for middlemen loan servicers (as 
opposed to the lenders themselves), serve to discourage modification 
outside bankruptcy.  Servicers have a financial incentive to foreclose, so 
that will often be the preferred course, even if it is not the best option for 
either the borrower or lender.105  A modification in bankruptcy law, 
however, could correct this problem. 
The existence of a bankruptcy-modification option would shift the 
dynamics of voluntary workouts.  To the extent that borrowers have a 
bankruptcy option, it puts pressure on servicers and lenders to make a deal 
outside of bankruptcy.  Permitting bankruptcy modification of mortgages 
would make voluntary modification of mortgages more likely, and would 
also make it more likely that Chapter 13 plans would succeed, as debtors 
who wished to retain their homes would have lower payment burdens to 
meet.106 
The creation of a second option, then––that borrowers could choose 
modification in bankruptcy instead of being forced into foreclosure––
would give debtors some leverage and encourage more voluntary workouts.  
And voluntary workouts should be most advantageous to both sides (only 
hurting middlemen capitalizing on the fees and transaction costs involved 
in bankruptcy or foreclosure). 
Allowing the modification of student loans in bankruptcy would have 
a similar positive effect.  It seems plausible that transaction costs similar to 
those faced in the home foreclosure context also affect the student loan 
market.  If banks must pay collection agencies and court fees in order to get 
small sums of money from indigent debtors, they would be indifferent 
between a debtor declaring bankruptcy and a debtor struggling to make 
 
 103.  Id. at 590.   
 104.  Id. at 618. 
 105.  Id. at 624. 
 106.  Id. at 626. 
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payments on loans that she can never discharge.  The fact that lenders do 
not seem to alter their prices in response to bankruptcy laws supports this 
hypothesis.  As discussed earlier, research into FICO credit scores 
demonstrated that there was virtually no change in the availability of 
student loans after the enactment of the 2005 bankruptcy amendments that 
protected private borrowers.107  This suggests that lenders are not raising 
their interest rates or tightening credit requirements based on legal 
protections preventing student loan discharge.  Absent some other 
impediment to free market pricing, lenders would have altered their rates in 
response to a change in bankruptcy laws that affected their returns.  As 
increased prices and decreased availability of loans was by far the strongest 
justification for preventing the discharge of student loans in bankruptcy, a 
conclusion that bankruptcy law is not affecting prices seriously undermines 
the argument for maintaining bankruptcy protection for student loans. 
It also seems reasonable to conclude that voluntary workouts outside 
of bankruptcy would be the best possible solution in the student loan 
context.  Bankruptcy necessarily involves transactional costs, in addition to 
damaging the bankrupt’s credit score and reputation.  But a bank incurs 
collection costs and is unlikely to receive payment in full if it seeks to 
collect loans from a debtor without adequate means to repay them.  The 
best solution, then, appears to be for the lender and debtor to voluntarily 
modify the terms of the loan outside of a bankruptcy proceeding.  As 
Levitin argued in addressing mortgages, the availability of a modification 
option in bankruptcy will encourage more modifications outside of 
bankruptcy.  When the debtor has a choice to enter bankruptcy and modify 
the terms of her loan, the lenders and servicers will be incentivized to 
modify the terms of the loan outside of bankruptcy.108 
One could attack this comparison between bankruptcy law governing 
mortgages and student loans by pointing out that only mortgages are 
secured by a tangible asset––a house.  However, even though educational 
lenders cannot foreclose on a diploma, they are still entitled to a share of a 
borrower’s income until the debt is repaid, and that income stream should 
have increased as a result of the educational loans.  Graduates of four-year 
universities earn an average of $800,000 more over the course of their 
careers than workers with only a high school diploma.109  In the aggregate, 
 
 107.  See Kantrowitz, supra note 91, at 3–4 (showing that, in one data set, borrowers’ 
credit scores did not change at all after the legislation was enacted, and, in a second data set, 
that those scores changed only minimally). 
 108.  Levitin, supra note 14, at 626. 
 109.  SANDY BAUM & JENNIFER MA, EDUCATION PAYS: THE BENEFITS OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY 10 (College Board 2007), 
http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/about/news_info/trends/ed_pays_2007.pdf. 
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then, lenders are “secured” in their loan by the increased stream of income 
that the borrower will earn throughout his life as a result of his degree.  Of 
course, some educational borrowers will not increase their income through 
their studies, and some will borrow money but never complete a degree.  
But some mortgages will end up underwater—indeed, with the recent 
downturn in housing prices, a record twenty-three percent of all mortgage 
holders owe more than what their home is worth.110  Thus, there is no 
fundamental difference between student loans and mortgages that would 
prevent an analogy between how they would respond to changes in 
bankruptcy law. 
V. MOVING TOWARDS A BETTER SYSTEM 
As it has been shown, there is little justification for keeping the 
current system in place.  The long history of increased protections for 
lenders has been based on justifications of fraud, soft fraud, internalization, 
public fisc, and the cost of private capital.  The first four arguments are 
easily dismissed, and clearly insufficient to support a law that so seriously 
limits the options of debtors who have taken on student loan debt.  Only the 
cost of private capital argument remains as a serious reason for the current 
law, and while it is widely advanced by the credit industry, the results of 
the FICO credit study by Kantrowitz and the analysis of mortgages done by 
Levitin both undermine this theory.111  Those studies both showed little or 
no change in the price or availability of loans based on the underlying 
bankruptcy laws; without a correlation between bankruptcy laws and the 
cost of capital, there is no remaining justification for the current policy.  
Though lawmakers have singled out educational loans for special discharge 
protections since the 1970s, there is no evidence that educational loans are 
fundamentally different from other types of loans that can be discharged. 
There are several possible ways to reform the way in which the 
bankruptcy system treats student loans, the simplest of which is to turn 
back the clock on the amendments to the law.  A gradual repeal of the 
bankruptcy amendments would clearly be the most politically palatable, as 
a return to the law of 1976 where all students’ loans were dischargeable 
would encounter enormous opposition from lenders.  The 2005 
amendments, which extended protections to private lenders instead of only 
 
 110.  AnnaMaria Andriotis, New Options for Underwater Homeowners, MARKETWATCH 
(Mar. 30, 2011, 11:28 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/new-options-for-underwater-
homeowners-1301075928064 (concluding this metric from data sourced from CoreLogic, a 
mortgage-data firm). 
 111.  See Kantrowitz, supra note 91, at 3–4 (describing experiment results); Levitin, 
supra note 14, at 590 (same).   
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governmentally connected loans, are the first place to start.  If Kantrowitz’s 
research into the availability of student loans is correct, and a return to the 
pre-2005 law did not affect the availability of student loans, there would be 
strong justifications for continuing to undo the bankruptcy code 
modifications:  bringing back waiting periods (after which time loans 
would be dischargeable), limiting the loans that were protected from 
discharge, and relaxing the definition of undue hardship, so that debtors 
with true hardship have access to discharge and/or modification of their 
loans in bankruptcy. 
It is important to note that a repeal of bankruptcy protections for 
student loans does not mean a regime of easy discharge for soon-to-be high 
wage earners.  The fraud provisions of the bankruptcy code already prevent 
this.112  And any bankruptcy system allowing for the discharge of 
educational loans could easily make that discharge conditional on future 
income.  If the bankrupt’s income rose substantially in the period 
immediately after he declared bankruptcy, his creditors would be entitled to 
recoup more of the debt that was discharged.113  While this would hinder 
the bankruptcy principle of giving a debtor a fresh start, in that he would 
not be completely liberated from creditor’s claims until several years after a 
bankruptcy, it would strike a balance between the needs of the borrower 
and lender, and certainly be more equitable than the current system. 
In crafting such a system, one could look to the Loan Repayment 
Assistance Programs (LRAPs) already in place at many law schools.  In 
order to address the concerns of law students who want to work in lower 
paying public interest positions, but would need to borrow six figures in 
student loans in order to afford their legal education, LRAPs promise that a 
law school will repay a student’s debt if he makes less than a specified 
annual salary for a set period of time.  For example, the University of 
Chicago will pay off all law school loans for students who work a public 
interest position for ten years and make less than $80,000 per year.114 
Of course, the Bankruptcy Code cannot seek to create a system to 
match the generous loan repayment programs at prestigious private 
 
 112.  See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2006) (barring bankruptcy discharge where “debts for 
money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit” were obtained 
by “false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting 
the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition”). 
 113.  See Pottow, supra note 72, at 267 (examining “income contingent systems” in 
place in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, under which “the more a debtor 
earns, the more she pays toward her government-funded student debt”).   
 114.  The University of Chicago Law School Office of Communications, Dramatic New 
LRAP Offers Chicago Law Graduates in Public Interest Careers Unparalleled Support 
(Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/dramatic-new-lrap-offers-chicago-law-
graduates-public-interest-careers-unparalleled-support. 
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universities.  But the logic behind the systems must be the same.  One 
should not seek repayment for loans from individuals who are not making 
enough money to repay them.  Of course, borrowers must be required to 
show an inability to repay their loans, as well as agree to continue to repay 
as much of their loans as feasible at a lower monthly rate.  A system that 
would demand higher payments if the debtor’s income increased after 
bankruptcy, but also allow some discharge of the debt, would safeguard 
against fears of abuse.  This sort of compromise, then, between the current 
system of no discharges whatsoever, and the pre-1976 system offering a 
complete fresh start, may provide the best solution for allowing debtors 
some relief while ensuring that lenders are repaid at an acceptable rate.  
